Terrorist attacks carried out by individuals or single cells have significantly accelerated over the last 20 years. This type of terrorism, defined as lone-actor (LA) terrorism, stands as one of the greatest security threats of our time. Research on LA behavior and characteristics has emerged and accelerated over the last decade. While these studies have produced valuable information on demographics, behavior, classifications, and warning signs, the relationship among these characters are yet to be addressed.
Introduction
Terrorism is defined as an act of aggression or violence against noncombatants with the objective of affecting policy makers indirectly by intimidating the target audience [1] . Terrorist threat does not arise from a desire for financial gain or mere personal vengeance; there is a higher political, ideological or gation) and the radical action, and this transition is not inevitable. However, the authors also conclude that not all LAs need to climb the opinion pyramid before committing an attack; it is a matter of opportunity rather than an obligation [12] . A more extensive behavioral study conducted by Meloy et al. [9] defined eight "proximal warning behaviors" for an LA attack. It is essential to have a "pathway behavior" from grievance to attack. An LA fixates on a target or an ideology more intensely over time and identifies himself with the cause or a role model. LAs may leak their intent directly or indirectly throughout their pathway. An attack requires familiarity with weapons; hence, they conduct dry runs to test their abilities. Before an attack, there is an "energy burst" indicating that the settlements and preparations for the attack have started. Occasionally, LAs directly threaten the target and they may also hint that the attack is their only option or "last resort". These "proximal warning behaviors" can, then, be used in the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), which is a professional LA risk-assessment framework [13] . Beside these "proximal warning behaviors", TRAP-18 involves 10 "distal characteristics". These distal characteristics are a) having a personal grievance and moral outage; b) having been framed by an ideology; c) failing to affiliate with an extremist group; d) depending on virtual communities; e) thwarting of occupational goals; f ) changes in thinking and emotion; g) failing of sexual-intimate pairing; h) having a mental disorder; i) being creative and innovative; j) having a criminal violence history [13] .
Some of these elements are difficult to trace in real life; most physical moves of an LA are hardly traceable. Moreover, conventional attack prevention techniques, such as infiltration or wiretapping, are not effective for LA attacks due to the absence of a group [6] . The silver lining in LA detection is that they are commonly radicalized by Internet exchanges; and, therefore leave their "writeprints" [6, 9] .
They spread their views and opinions before committing an actual attack [6] . The biggest challenge of detecting an LA online is that search engines cannot access to the "deep web" in which such exchanges often take place.
Classification of LAs
Although, LAs have some commonalities such as acting alone or having fixated on an ideology, their behaviors along the pathway to violence may vary among different attacker types. Consequently, the existing literature proposes different classification domains for LAs. Some examples of these domains are location, purpose, type of target, goals, and "role in protection" [14] .
Pantucci [7] categorized LAs as the loner, the lone wolf, the lone wolf pack, and the lone attacker depending on the number of people involved and the existence of a chain of command. Bates et al.'s classification used four dimensions to group LAs: degree of self-radicalization, risk-awareness level of the LA, altruistic motivation, and the number of attacks intended [14] . Gill et al. [5] classified LAs in terms of their ideologies: right-wing, islamists, and single issue. They argued that even though LAs as a whole do not have any distinguishing characteristics except mostly being males, subgroups have very noticeable characteristics in terms of demographics, network connectivity and operational success. This ideology-based classification was commonly applied in literature. Meloy and Gill [15] applied statistical analyses that compared three ideological groups in terms of their distal characteristics and warning behaviors. They found out that right-wing LAs are less fixated on their ideologies, single-issue LAs are less dependent on virtual communities. Sawyer and Hienz [16] included far-left and hybrid (combination of different ideologies) to their classification, albeit they were less in number compared to the three main ideological groups.
Quantitative Approaches for LA Terrorism
Meaningful statistical analyses over LAs are difficult to conduct since LA attacks are black-swan events that are rare even in extremist ideologies, which makes them impossible to label, let alone forecasted [8] .
Similarly, commonly applied terrorist social network analysis methods fail due to the absence of a group network [17, 18] . However, with the help of social media and online forums, identification, leakage and fixation are traceable online. Brynielsson et al. [6] extracted the attack intent of an LA through text mining. Intent appears as an important indicator of an attack in the economic analysis of an LA attack [1, 2] . Phillips [1] implemented a quantitative model that shows a decrease in the probability of an attack in case of higher-level of security (the deterrence effect) but an increase in the probability of an improvised attack plan by momentarily switching the target (the substitute effect). In addition, he modeled the increase in the probability of an attack with the increased financial resources of the attacker (the endowment effect) and embedded the risk-averse/risk-seeking behavior of the attacker in the model (the preference effect) in a game-theoretical scheme. Gordon et al. [19] worked on weights of different criteria in the intent of an attacker. They also implemented a Delphi Method, in which a facilitator gathers expert opinions anonymously with the sole purpose of arriving to a consensus by supplying recursive feedback.
Most quantitative studies on LA behavior are composed of summary statistics and hypothesis tests over LA demographics and behavior. A recent study by Philips (2017) compares the USA and other 15 developed countries in terms of casualties and demonstrates that LA attacks are deadly threats especially in the United States. Schuurman et al. [20] analyzed the LA cases in North America and Europe between 1985-2015 and provided striking results. They found that over 80% of LA attacks on American targets between 1999 and 2009 were prevented by the attention of law enforcement or the general public such as neighborhood watches. According to their data, 46% of LAs had shown violent behavior, 62% of them had contacts with radical, extremists people or terrorists and 31% were well-known members of these groups. 86% of LAs communicated their attack-related ideas via oral communication or social media leakage. Ellis et al. [21] found that weapons training increases the number of casualties per attack from an average of 1.47 to 2.29. A study by Gill et al. [5] used hypothesis testing and showed that LAs do not have a defining characteristic as a whole but that the subgroups of right-wing, single issue and jihadist terrorists have their own demographics and network structures. Even within the same subgoup the weapon choice, and the attack preparation of an LA may present different casualty outcomes. Thus it is clear that although ideology-based classification leads up to common demographic characteristics [5] , it may not necessarily provide commonalities in terms of behavioral characteristics or responses.
Another challenge for behavioral analyses is that the term "behavior" have different scopes in literature. Besides, the terms "terrorist behavior" or "attacker behavior" can refer to different concepts.
In some studies, the term involves attack-related behavior such as identification or fixation [6] , while in some others, "behavior" refers to the response, mood or observable actions of a terrorist [22] .
These studies indicate that while knowledge on LA definition, typology, and demographics is available to a certain extent, relationships among these characteristics are yet to be discovered. This paper intends to address this problem and makes the following contributions to the literature:
• Provides clarification on the "behavior" term with a temporal perspective.
• Identifies 25 binary attributes for LA characteristics based on the data prepared by Hamm and Spaaij [23] .
• Defines behavior-based attacker types using these binary attributes.
• Compares pre-9/11 LAs to post-9/11 LAs to reflect the temporal changes in LA terrorism.
• Analyzes the implications among LA behaviors for each type.
• Forms chain rules that sum up the evolution process of each attacker type.
• Extracts temporal relations between LA behavior milestones for each type.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides detailed information on the means of LA data gathering and processing, the identification of 25 attributes for LA characteristics, and various LA classification schemes. Section 3 introduces the A-priori algorithm, describes its statistical properties and the rule-chain-formation procedure. Section 4.1 provides associations for the pooled database, and Section 4.2 compares pre-and post-9/11 era to demonstrate how LA terrorism has changed through decades. Section 4.3 introduces LA types based on three classification schemes: i) ideology-based, ii) incidentscene-based, and iii) behavioral-based. Section 5 forms behavioral and chronological association chains of LAs for each type. Section 6 demonstrates the temporal relationship among observable landmarks on the attack pathway. The concluding remarks follow in the last section.
LA Characteristics, Behavior, Data, and Classifications

Data for LA Behavior and Characteristics
The National Criminal Justice Reference System database prepared by Hamm and Spaaij [23] involves 98 LA attacks in the USA between 1940-2013. This dataset can be used to obtain data on LA behavior and attack characteristics. While providing extremely valuable data, the database lacks the recent data on LA attacks, given the fact that LA terrorism has been on the rise especially over the last decade.
However, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [24] holds the records of all terrorist events worldwide and the Mother Jones database [25] holds the records of all mass shootings in the USA. The GTD records the data of attacks until the end of 2017, and it identifies 192 incidents in the USA between 2014-2017.
However, these incidents do not only involve LA attacks; they also involve attacks claimed by terrorist groups, and unclaimed or unresolved attacks. Similarly, The Mother Jones database contains all mass shootings whose overwhelming majority involve a single perpetrator; however, not all shootings by a single person are categorized as LA terrorism. The following filter is used to distinguish LAs from other terrorist attacks in the GTD and other mass shootings in the Mother Jones database.
• For the GTD, the attacks should be planned and committed by a single person or two-person cells (dyads). These two-person cells will be evaluated separately for each attacker since they have been observed to exhibit different behaviors and have been provoked by different environmental responses even for the same incident.
• In the GTD, all unclaimed and unresolved attacks are excluded, since these attacks do not provide any data for the attacker's characteristics.
• For the Mother Jones database, the motivations of attackers are checked, and violence stemming solely from a personal grievance are excluded. However, for the sake of further research, we should note that bullying-related attacks have recently been discussed for inclusion as a part of single-issue events [26] .
In the GTD, 70 of the 196 attacks are unclaimed or unresolved, and 84 of the attacks are identified as LA attacks. In the Mother Jones Database, 17 out of 44 mass shootings satisfy the criteria of being committed by a single person and stemming from an ideology-based grievance. 9 of those mass shootings match with the records of the GTD. In total, data for 190 LAs have been obtained using these three databases.
Using the National Criminal Justice Reference System database as a template, we have gathered data on the following characteristics of the attackers:
• Demographic and socio-economic data: age, race, gender, marital status, mental health history, employment status and military history.
• Distal characteristics: criminal history, relation to radical groups, means of radicalization.
• Proximal warning behaviors: triggering event and leakage.
• Attack decisions: Target and weapon selection • Attack consequences: fatalities and after-attack behavior.
The distinction between "distal characteristics" and "proximal warning behaviors" in [13, 15] is that the distal characteristics belong to the history of an LA before the attack idea and preparations.
"Proximal warning behaviors" start with "pathway to violence" provoked by an ideological and personal grievance. It can be observed that the distal characteristics or proximal warning behaviors we employ do not match one-to-one to [13] , since our data do not specify the warning behaviors such as "last resort", "energy burst" or "directly communicated threat". Using the available data, the distal characteristics are selected in a way to maximize their relevance to radicalization and violence.
Our data involves four female LAs (two in the pre-9/11 era, two in the post-9/11 era); which is a very small number among all LAs. Hence, any gender-based analysis on LAs would lack sufficient data. Three pre-9/11-era LAs have chosen terrorism as a career and committed multiple attacks over a decade.
Excluding these three LAs, the average age of attackers is 35.11 with a standard deviation of 13.73 and a median of 31. The ages range from 15 to 88. Observations from the data indicate that sudden changes in marital status, mental health history, employment status, and military history serve as a triggering event. In fact, the three most common personal triggering events are separation from partner, losing job or student status, and emergence of mental or physical health issues. While we acknowledge that these factors contribute to radicalism and violence, socio-economic and demographic characteristics may be related to an attack in a proximal or distal way. Hence, we embed some of the socio-economic or demographic data into distal and proximal characteristics. However, we try to avoid using demographic and socio-economic data directly in our behavioral characterization for the sake of fairness.
Through the resources [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 27] , we construct the following exhaustive list of behaviors by breaking down the rest of the data into 25 binary exhaustive characteristics.
• Criminal history before the attack As aforementioned, the existing literature handles the term "behavior" differently. In our study, the term "behavior" is defined as the observable actions of the LA [28] . Hence, to provide semantic clarity, we first introduce the following temporal terminology on attacker behavior:
Early behavior and characteristics: These behaviors and characteristics do not affect the attack directly; they are behaviors or responses before the idea of an attack emerges. The radicalization process is involved in this section. Examples are prior criminal history, childhood abuse, employment status.
In some cases, a triggering event is included in this phase which is a mostly personal grievance that results with the attack idea. In other cases, incremental radicalization causes the attack idea without requiring any triggering incidents. Distal characteristics in the TRAP 18 framework [13] are among the early behavior and characteristics.
Preparatory and precursor behavior and characteristics: These types of behaviors and characteristics are the activities or responses that comes with the attack idea such as acquiring or transporting weaponry, leaking intent, capability testing through dry-runs, meetings and other communications, committing fraud to travel to attack locations, etc. Proximal behaviors in the TRAP 18 framework [13] are among the preparatory and precursor behavior and characteristics.
Incident-scene behavior and characteristics: These types of behaviors and characteristics are the activities at the incident scene prior to the attack. Examples include following an abnormal trajectory, counter-surveillance related or cycling behavior, wearing suspicious clothing (a trench coat on a 95degree day, sunglasses on a rainy day, etc.). Incident-scene behavior is analyzed under abnormal or unusual trajectory. Inevitably, information at this detail is not available publicly or in literature, since attacks are either limitedly or partially caught on grainy security footage or not caught at all.
After-attack behavior and characteristics: These types of behaviors and characteristicss involve the behavior of the terrorist right after the attack. Some examples include escaping the scene, committing suicide. The available literature mostly focuses on early, preparatory and after-attack behavior [6, 8] .
The first 8 characteristics in the list involve the attacker's early behavior and characteristics. In this period, having prior criminal records and formal weaponry training are factors that are found to increase the number of casualties [29] . In fact, Capellan et al. [30] emphasized that some LAs enroll in the formal weaponry training units just to enhance their attack capabilities. The locus of radicalization also differs among attackers. An LA, who is responsible for 16 bank robberies and two bombings, was radicalized by his parents since childhood, while another one was a member of Al-Qaeda. Therefore, while some LAs have prior contacts to extremist or terrorist organizations; others have no connections to radical organizations but to radical people. Furthermore, some LAs do not have connections to even radical people, they are radicalized by their own "gaslighting". For example, another LA opened fire to Family Research Council headquarters in 2013, initiated his radicalization process by himself through biased research from various websites. The means of radicalization characteristic distinguishes LAs as being initiated to radicalization by other people or by their own effort.
The attack decision may or may not stem from a triggering event. The triggering event can be personal such as being fired from a job, or social events such as 9/11-attacks [23] . While some LAs do not require a triggering event but are radicalized by incremental and cumulative life experiences, some others require being triggered multiple times in order to develop the attack intent. In our database, 99 out of 152 LAs have certain triggering events initiating the attack idea. Out of these 99 LAs, 67 of them were triggered by a personal event. Two of these LAs were triggered by multiple personal events. 30
LAs were triggered by a social event. Two LAs were triggered both by a social and a personal event.
Personal trigger events are broken down as in Table 1 . Leakage is also a common trait of attackers; many LAs leak their intent before the actual attack. One extreme case belongs to an LA who posted a 1500-page manifestation on social media the night before the attack [6] . These leaks can be offline through chats, letters, etc.; or online through social media, e-mails, etc. Our definition of online leakage involves the cases where the LA benefits from the Internet to broadcast attack intent; hence, phone calls or television broadcasts are considered as offline.
Personal Event Frequency
Target selection is another attack characteristic and the targets are civilians in most attacks. However, if the LA fixates on a person that symbolizes the enemy ideology; the attacker may choose to spare other civilians. The target can also be the security forces, military, or a formal government official on duty [31] .
Most LA attacks are conducted with firearms which are shown to be more deadly [29] . Other weapons include explosives, blades, bodily weapons (hand, feet, etc.), or vehicles (trucks, cars, etc.).
LA Classification
Using 9/11 as a cutoff point for understanding recent exacerbation in terrorism, we first compare pre-9/11 and post-9/11 LAs to detect the changes in LA terrorism over time. Then, focusing on post-9/11 LAs, we classify them in multiple domains. The first classification domain is offered by Gill et al. [5] , that is, the ideological classification: jihadists, right-wing LAs, and single-issue LAs.
The second classification domain is clustering according to incident-scene behavior. However, incidentscene visuals or data are not publicly available. Serious game design simulating real-world conditions is a suitable surrogate and a widely-used approach for the resolution of such predicaments [32] . In the absence of available data, at the Game Research for Information SecuriTy (GRIST) Lab 1 at Rutgers, we have developed a 2D-game where players can imitate the trajectory and target selection of an attacker or the strategy of a defender aiming to catch the attacker. The game considers the effect of human dynamics and crowd flow on target selection. In this game, the attacker moves over a network and knows the density of each adjacent node before he makes his selection to move to an adjacent node or stay at the same node, or attack (see Figure 1 ). On the other hand, the defender patrols the network without knowing the exact location of the attacker. If both players are at the same node, the defender detects the attacker with some probability. Data from playthroughs are collected for each session. node's centrality. In the clustering results, the occupancy rank of nodes has emerged as more important than the actual population itself. According to these features, 5 types of attackers are extracted ( Table   2 ): i) maximum damagers, ii) symbolic attackers, iii) daredevils, iv) attention seekers, and iv) stallers.
The maximum damagers follow the nodes to reach a node with the highest population, whereas stallers tend to keep a spiral route and wait for an opportunity to attack a fixated target. Daredevils stay close to the defenders in a risk-seeking manner.
The real-world counterparts of these LA types are derived from the correlations between game and real-world data. Real-world maximum damagers aim to harm as many people as possible or conduct a series of attacks. Real world symbolic attackers target a person or a leader that symbolizes the "enemy" ideology or send a message without causing any harm by attacking fake weapons. Daredevils attack Table 2 : LA-types using incident-scene behavior obtained from the playable game.
directly security forces where being unsuccessful is highly likely or go on a killing spree without a plan;
whereas, attention seekers attack central locations at odd hours without intending heavy casualties.
Finally, stallers fixate on a location or a person, stalk the target, and plan the attack.
Finally, the third classification domain is in terms of behaviors. In order to obtain behavioral classes, 152 post-9/11 LAs are clustered by a K-Means algorithm. The best results are obtained with 7 clusters with distinct characteristics. 3 of these clusters contain a small and insufficient number of LAs, and hence, we will operate on the 4 clusters involving sufficient number of LAs.
Methodology
A-priori Algorithm
The A-priori algorithm was proposed by Agrawal and Srikant [33] , and has been successfully applied to many social problems. Nijkemp et al. [34] implemented it to identify the association rules for the valuation of different biodiversity indicators and different kinds of habitats, while Parack et al. [35] analyzed the relationship between grading system and attendance in an educational setting. A securitybased application of the A-priori algorithm is [36] , which analyzed the relationship between different classes of passengers and safety factors.
In this study, the A-priori algorithm is applied to extract the associations among behavioral and attack characteristics. For LAs, an association rule of the form A → B can be interpreted as "If behavior A exists, then behavior B also exists". A rule chain is of the form A → B → C, meaning that "If behavior A exists, then behavior B also exists. If Behavior B exists, then behavior C also exists.". It should be noted that association rules do not imply a cause-effect relationship; these rules state that given one behavior, another behavior may also exists. Mathematical derivation of association rules are explained and every mathematical formula is presented in Appendix A.
Let S be a set of d items, i.e. S = {s1, s2, . . . , s d }, and T be a set of n transactions in a database, i.e. T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}. A transaction involves at least one item. In the LA terrorism setting, the transactions are LAs, and the items are one of the 25 binary characteristics. As we have constructed the list of characteristics in an exhaustive manner, a given LA satisfies at least one condition on the list.
In our case, d = 25 representing each one of the 25 binary characteristics, and n is 190 for overall LA evaluations, 38 for pre-9/11 LAs, 152 for post-9/11 LAs since it is the number of LAs that are available in each category.
In order to establish an association rule of the form A → B (denoting that a characteristic implies another), two item-sets must employ three thresholds to pass: support, confidence, and lift. The support of A is defined as the fraction of all transactions involving A, and the support of B is similarly defined.
In the LA setting, the support threshold checks if these characteristics, are one-by-one frequent enough so that we can generalize these characteristics. If the support exceeds a predetermined threshold, then the itemsets are assumed to be frequent enough. Then, cohesion is calculated as an inverse measure of entropy. If the cohesion exceeds a predetermined threshold, it can be concluded that A implies B. We refer the readers to Appendix A.1 for mathematical details.
Parameter Selection
We define a strong association rule or a strong implication as rules with a minimum support threshold of 20% and a minimum confidence threshold of 70%. A two-way association rule or a two-way implication is the case where X → Y and Y → X, and it is denoted by X ↔ Y . A strong two-way association rule or a strong two-way implication where both X → Y and Y → X exceed a minimum support threshold of 20% and a minimum confidence threshold of 70%. It should be noted that the literature on A-priori association rules mostly implement a minimum support threshold level of 10-15% [37, 38] . However, LA events are rare, making LA data a small dataset. 10-20% of the data refers to a number that is insufficient for generalization. Hence, the minimum support threshold is increased to 50%. If the support threshold is too low, the emerging characters will be in small numbers that will prevent generalization. If it is too high, then some associations will be lost by dropping important characters due to a high filter rate. The minimum support and minimum confidence threshold values are determined by tuning in a way that provides both sufficient number of data and emergence of important association rules.
The A-priori algorithm parameters (support and confidence) aim to balance generating non-significant association rules (type 1 error) and not missing significant ones (type 2 error) [39] . In our case, the minimum confidence threshold is 0.7 which is a relatively low value. Such a confidence level avoids missing significant rules, at the expense of producing non-significant ones. Once a rule is constructed in the form of A → B, it requires a further statistical test to determine the significance of a rule. This test has the null hypothesis that A and B are independent. In order to check independence, the number of occurences of A and B are compared to the expected number of occurences when they are independent.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then a proof for the associations have been found. We refer the readers to Appendix A.1 for mathematical details.
Chain Rules (R-Rules)
An The statistical significance of an R-rule is measured by cohesion [40] . While the item-wise cohesion measure checks whether A does not occur frequently enough without B, the rule-wise cohesion measure uses the cohesion for if A → B, B → C, and A → C holds. We refer the readers to Appendix A.2 for mathematical details.
Association Rules for LA Behavior
The following subsections present the outputs of the A-priori algorithm results. In Section ??, we provide the A-priori algorithm results for all 190 LAs in the database, and Section ?? compare pre-and post-9/11
LAs, and displays the temporal change in LA characteristics. Bakker and de Graaf [8] conclude that LAs yield more common characteristics when analyzed by their ideologies. Referring to this study, in
Section ??, we analyze LAs according to their ideological motivations. We also compare these results to incident-scene-based classification (Section ??) and behavior-based classification (Section ??).
Overall evaluations
Analyzing 190 LAs over 60 years, we have found the following most common characteristics:
• 62.1% of all LAs required a triggering event,
• 62.1% of all LAs targeted civilians,
• 59.5% of all LAs committed their attacks using firearms,
• 52.1% of LAs had no prior connections to extremist/terrorist people,
• 51.0% of LA attacks were fatal.
The overall analysis of 190 LAs produce few common characteristics and none them belong to the early behavior stage. Hence, these common characteristics are not viable in capturing the early signs of an LA. Figure 2 displays the associations among common characteristics found by the A-priori algorithm.
These results are:
• One strong two-way association emerges: the usage of firearms imply fatalities, and vice versa.
• Only two strong one-way associations are available for all LAs.
-Usage of firearms implies a triggering event.
-Fatalities imply civilian targets.
Even though some commonalities can be identified, the face of LAs have changed significantly through time. To capture these changes, we will first compare pre-9/11 LAs to post-9/11 LAs. The color white indicates three possibilities: i) the confidence of the rule is less than 0.5, ii) the confidence of the rule is greater than 0.5 but the lift is less than 1, therefore, the associations are coincidental, and iii) at least one item is not frequent enough to construct an association. The shades of gray indicate the magnitude of the confidence, where darker shades specify a stronger association.
Comparison of Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 LAs
Analyzing all LAs has yielded sparse relationships as shown in the previous section. One reason for this sparsity is that the triggers, technologies, opportunities, and other conditions that lead an LA to an attack has changed significantly over the years. Hence, in this subsection, we present the associations for pre-9/11 and post-9/11 LAs in a way to show how the LA terrorism has changed. The database holds 38 LAs before 9/11 and 152 LAs after 9/11 and the A-priori algorithm was separately applied to these two data sets. We present the figure of associations for both era in Figure 3 . The density of gray-shaded cells indicate that pre-9/11 LAs had more common characteristics than post-9/11 LAs. In the following subsections, we delve deeper into both time periods and present the results of the A-priori algorithm results. Figure 3 : Associations denoting temporal change in LA behavior. Pre-9/11 LAs having more associations than post-9/11 LAs shows that the LAs have diversified greatly in terms of behavior and characteristics.
Associations in the pre-9/11 era
We have found the following most common characteristics
• 81.6% of the pre-9/11 LAs used firearms in their attacks.
• 76.3% of the pre-9/11 LA attacks were fatal.
• 68.3% of the pre-9/11 LAs had a triggering event that led to attack idea.
• 65.8% of the LAs leaked intent offline.
• 65.8% of the LAs were not self-radicalized.
• 63.2% of the LAs had prior contacts with extremist or terrorist groups.
The algorithm produces eight strong two-way associations:
• The existence of a triggering event implies the usage of firearms, and vice versa.
• Having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies not being self-radicalized, and vice versa.
• The existence of a triggering event implies offline leakage, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies a trigger event, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies usage of firearms, and vice versa.
• Civilian targets imply fatalities, and vice versa.
• Usage of firearms implies fatalities, and vice versa.
Strong one-way associations are:
• Having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups are implied by being able to escape from the crime scene.
• The existence of a triggering event and the usage of firearms are implied by any of the following: having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, offline leakage, targeting a person who symbolizes an enemy ideology, being able to escape from the crime scene.
• Offline leakage is implied by targeting a person who symbolizes an enemy ideology.
• Fatalities are implied by having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, offline leakage, targeting civilians or a person who symbolizes an enemy ideology, being able to escape from the crime scene.
Associations in the post-9/11 era
In this era, the LA attack types and modi operandi have diverged, and as a result there is only one common characteristic
• 60.5% of the LAs had a triggering event that led to the attack idea.
Interestingly, no strong two-way associations are obtained for this time period and as can be seen from Figure 3b , only one strong one-way association exists for post-9/11 LAs:
• The usage of firearms implies a triggering event.
Comparison of Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 LAs.
The common characteristics and the associations show that pre-9/11 LAs had more connections to extremist/terrorist people or groups than post-9/11 LAs. This indicates that while violence once was a means chosen by extremist-adjacent people, it has now trickled down to emerge as an option even for people without any radical connections. This result also holds for formal weaponry training (military or otherwise). While pre-9/11 LAs had a rate of 47% in formal weaponry training, this characteristic applies to 22% of post-9/11 LAs, indicating that terrorism has spread into the realm of ordinary civilians more and more. Furthermore, LA terrorism has become more diverse in preparatory behaviors. While both preand post-9/11 LAs target civilians more, the rate of other groups has significantly risen. Targeting the law enforcement and government officials has increased from 13% to 29%. Similarly, weapon selection has also changed significantly. The usage of firearms has dropped from 89% to 53%. Post-9/11 LAs weapon choices vary from explosives to hatchets, machetes, as well as to public or personal vehicles.
The variety in target and weapon selection has led to varieties in the aftermath of the attack. While pre-9/11 attacks had a higher fatal attack rate (76%), post-9/11 LAs commit less attacks that have fatal consequences (47%). However, the number of fatalities per attack does not exhibit statistically significant differences. On the contrary, the standard deviation in the number of fatalities has more than doubled for post-9/11 LAs (from 3.60 to 8.43); meaning that, while the number of unsuccessful attacks has increased due to sting operations or improved technology, post-9/11 LAs have caused more mass casualty than pre-9/11 LAs. In terms of after-attack behavior, the rate of escapes significantly decreased while the rate of suicides/killings has increased due to the technological advances. For example, in 2016, the police killed an attacker with a remote-controlled bomb disposal robot, which was the first time that U.S. law enforcement used a robot to subdue a terrorist [41] .
Evaluations regarding attacker motivation
According to Bakker and de Graaf [8] , classifying LAs into three ideological segments (jihadists, rightwing LAs, single-issue LAs) produces numerous distinct characteristics. In our data, these three groups hold the 88% of the post-9/11 LAs. Grouping LAs according to their ideology reveals more similarities and stronger implications than overall comparisons. Among the 152 post-9/11 LAs, 40 are jihadist LAs, 58 are right-wing LAs, and 36 are single-issue LAs.
Association Rules for Jihadist LAs
Among 40 jihadist LAs, We have found the following most common characteristics
• 67.5% of jihadist LAs do not leak the attack intent.
• 62.5% of jihadist LAs choose weapons other than firearms as the means of attack (mostly explosives).
• 70% of jihadist LAs target civilians. Together with the law enforcement targets, they make up 97% of jihadist LAs' targets.
• Half of the jihadist LAs are not self-radicalized and half of them do not need a triggering event for to exhibit attack intent.
We have found only one strong two-way association:
We have also found one-way associations which are summarized as (Figure 4a ):
• Civilian targets are implied by no fatalities after the attack or no intent leakage.
• No injuries/fatalities after the attack are implied by being arrested at the crime scene.
• Being arrested at the crime scene is implied by not being self-radicalized.
Association Rules for Right-Wing LAs
Among 58 post-9/11 right-wing LAs, we have found the following most common characteristics
• 84.4% of the right-wing LAs target civilians.
• 70.7% of the right-wing LAs require a triggering event for the attack intent.
No strong two-way associations emerges among these LAs and we only find the following strong one-way associations which are ( Figure 4b ):
• Civilian targets are implied by not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• A triggering event is implied by either not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups or usage of firearms.
Association Rules for Single-Issue LAs
Among 36 post-9/11 single-issue LAs, we have found the following most common characteristics
• 72.2% of these single-issue LAs have no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups or people.
• 61.1% of these LAs require a traumatic triggering event to intend the attack.
Only one strong two-way association emerges:
• Usage of firearms implies law enforcement/government official targets, and vice versa.
Only two strong one-way associations emerge (Figure 4c ):
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups is implied by either law enforcement/government official targets or usage of firearms.
• Law enforcement/government official targets also imply the existence of a trigger event or no intent leakage. Even though each ideological class has distinctive demographic distinctive characters as given in [5, 8, 42] , this classification adds very little to the post-9/11 associations and the A-priori algorithm does not find many associations.
Evaluations regarding incident-scene behavior
Given that ideological classification has not provided distinct behavioral results, another perspective for behavior analysis becomes necessary. Such a classification also allows us to evaluate the reflection of incident-scene behavior in early, preparation, and after-attack behaviors. Out of 152 post-9/11 LAs, 54 of them are maximum damagers, 37 are symbolic attackers, 27 are daredevils, 27 are attention seekers, and 7 are stallers. The characteristics of each type are presented in Table 3 . Since the number of data for stallers are statistically insufficient for analysis, we will focus on the other four groups for associations. Table 3 : Class comparisons for incident-scene behavior.
Association Rules for Maximum Damagers
Among 58 post-9/11 maximum-damager LAs, we have found two common characteristics:
• 92.5% of the maximum damagers target civilians.
• 61.1% of the maximum damagers attacks are fatal.
One strong two-way associations emerges:
• The usage of firearms implies fatalities, and vice versa.
We have found the following strong one-way associations (Figure 5a ):
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies civilian targets and fatalities.
• A triggering event involves fatalities.
• The usage of other weapons implies civilians.
Association Rules for Symbolic Attackers
Among 37 post-9/11 symbolic-attacker LAs, we have found four common characteristics:
• 72.9% of the symbolic attackers use other weapons than firearms.
• 70.3% of their attacks end up with no injuries or fatalities.
• 67.5% of symbolic attackers do not have prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 64.5% of symbolic attackers require a triggering event for the attack intent.
We have found two strong two-way associations among symbolic attackers:
• Self-radicalization implies no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• The usage of other weapons than firearms implies no casualties, and vice versa.
Strong one-way associations found by the A-priori algorithm are (Figure 5b ):
• No casualties are implied by the existence of a triggering event or being self-radicalized.
• A triggering event implies not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• Self-radicalization implies a trigger event.
Association Rules for Daredevils
Among 27 post-9/11 daredevil LAs, we have found five common characteristics:
• 88.9% of the daredevils use firearms.
• 74.1% of the daredevils require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 70.4% of the daredevils target the law enforcement or government officials.
• 70.4% of the daredevils do not leak the attack intent.
• 62.9% of their attacks are fatal.
We have found four strong two-way associations among daredevils:
• Having no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies no leakage, and vice versa.
• A triggering event implies targeting the law enforcement or government officials, and vice versa.
• A triggering event implies targeting the usage of firearms officials, and vice versa.
• The usage of firearms implies targeting the law enforcement or government officials, and vice versa.
Strong one-way associations found by the A-priori algorithm are (Figure 5c ):
• Fatalities imply the usage of firearms.
• A trigger event is implied by not-being self-radicalized.
• Targeting the law enforcement or government officials is implied by either not-being self-radicalized or fatalities after attack.
• The usage of firearms implies not being self-radicalized.
Association Rules for Attention Seekers
Among 27 post-9/11 attention-seeker LAs, we have found three common characteristics:
• 67.0% of the attention seekers target civilians.
• 62.9% of their attacks end up with no injuries or fatalities.
• 62.9% of the attention seekers do not leak the attack intent.
No two-way strong associations are found for attention seekers but the following strong one-way associations are found 5d):
• Civilian targets are implied by either of the following: no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, the existence of a triggering event, or usage of other weapons than firearms.
• The existence of a triggering event is implied by either no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups or usage of firearms.
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies no leakage.
• Usage of other weapons than firearms implies no casualties.
Evaluations regarding behavioral clusters
This classification method attempts to maximize common characters in behaviors. For this reason, a clustering algorithm (K-Means algorithm) is applied to 152 post-9/11 LA data points. K-Means algorithm requires a predetermined number of clusters. To decide the optimal number of clusters, C-Index is used to validate the clustering results. A smaller C-Index indicates a better clustering [43] . In our trials, seven clusters produce the smallest C-Index value. However, three of these clusters only contain outliers and do not provide sufficient number of data for associations. Hence, we will proceed with four behavioral clusters. Table 4 shows the distinctive characteristics of each cluster. A triggering event appears as a characteristic for three clusters, and leakage is a common characteristic for one of the clusters. Noticeable similarities are found between the incident-scene-based and behavior-based classification (see Table 5 ).
More than half of the first and the third cluster is composed of maximum damagers. 55% of the LAs in the first cluster are maximum damagers. The LAs in this cluster target civilians, use firearms, and have high fatality rates. 61% of the fourth cluster is also composed of maximum damagers. The stories and backgrounds of these maximum damagers show that the first cluster contains LAs with a "me vs.
them" mentality and the fourth cluster contains LAs with a "us vs. them" mentality. An LA with a "me vs. them" mentality sees every civilian as a target; whereas, an LA with an "us vs. them" mentality wants to spare people with their own ideologies and only target civilians from other ideologies.
Furthermore, having a "me vs. them" mentality increases the fatality rate of attacks. An interesting Figure 5 : Incident-scene behavior produces more commonalities than ideology-based behavior as can be seen in Table 3 . Even though common characteristics have increased in number, most of these commonalities belong to the after-attack behavior. Traceable warning behaviors such as intent leakage or triggering event are not prominent in this classification.
result is that most "us vs. them" maximum damagers have prior contacts to extremist groups and are not self-radicalized. 67% of the second cluster is composed of symbolic attackers and attention seekers, who appear as self-radicalized. Slightly less than half of the third cluster is composed of daredevils.
Since their actions are not well-planned, their attacks are likely to fail and their arrest rate is high. The second cluster shows some similarity to symbolic attackers who are the majority in the cluster compared to other incident-scene types (48%). They are self-radicalized LAs with no prior extremist connections and they use other weapons than firearms. Daredevils form 43% of the third cluster who target the law enforcement and government officials with firearms. They do not leak intent because the duration between trigger event and attack is mostly very short. The last cluster has no triggering event and do not leak intent. Fortunately, their attacks are mostly not fatal. Associations for each cluster is presented in the following subsection. Table 6 shows the ideological tendencies of each cluster. While first two clusters have a majority of right-wing terrorists, the third cluster (mostly daredevils) is very diverse in terms of ideology. Finally, the last cluster ("us vs. them" maximum damagers) is almost equally dominated by jihadists and right-wing terrorists. Table 6 : Relationship between ideology-based and behavioral-based classification
• 100.0% of them target civilians.
• 96.7% of them use firearms.
• 90.3% of them require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 87.1% of their attacks are fatal.
• 77.4% of them have no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 65.4% of them commit suicide or are killed at the crime scene.
We have identified six strong two-way associations:
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
• Online leakage implies committing suicide or being killed at the crime scene, and vice versa.
• Not having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies fatalities, and vice versa.
• Civilian targets imply a triggering event, and vice versa.
• The usage of firearms implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
Additionally, we have found the following strong one-way associations:
• Civilian targets are implied by either of the following: no prior criminal history, the existence of a triggering event, online leakage, or committing suicide or being killed at the crime scene.
• Not having prior criminal history implies no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups and fatalities.
• Committing suicide or being killed at the crime scene implies fatalities.
Association Rules for Cluster 2
Cluster 2 contains 27 LAs. Among these LAs, the common characteristics we have observed are:
• 93.6% of them have no prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 93.6% of them use other weapons than firearms.
• 87.1% of them are self-radicalized.
• 77.2% of them do not leak the attack intent.
• 67.8% of them require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 64.5% of them target civilians.
• 64.5% of their attacks have no casualties.
We have found three strong two-way associations:
• The existence of a triggering event implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
• No leakage implies not having any prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• Self-radicalization implies not having any prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
We have also found the following strong one-way associations:
• No casualties imply the existence of a triggering event, not having any prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and self-radicalization.
• Not having prior criminal history implies no leakage and self-radicalization.
• Civilian targets imply no leakage and usage of other weapons than firearms.
Association Rules for Cluster 3
Cluster 3 contains 24 LAs. The common characteristics of these LAs are given below:
• 91.7% of them are not self-radicalized.
• 87.5% of them require a triggering event for the attack intent.
• 83.3% of them have prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 79.7% of them target the law enforcement or government officials.
• 85.0% of them use firearms.
• 70.8% of them do not leak the attack intent.
• 87.0% of their attacks have no casualties.
• 87.0% of them are arrested at the crime scene.
We have found five strong two-way associations such that:
• Not being self-radicalized implies targeting the law enforcement/government officials, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• Not being self-radicalized implies the usage of firearms, and vice versa.
• Having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups implies targeting the law enforcement/government officials, and vice versa.
• The usage of firearms implies targeting the law enforcement/government officials, and vice versa.
We have also found the following strong one-way associations
• Being arrested after the attack implies no leakage, the usage of firearms, and targeting the law enforcement/government officials.
Association Rules for Cluster 4
Cluster 4 contains 23 LAs. The common characteristics of these LAs are given below:
• 100.0% of them use other weapons than firearms.
• 87.0% of them target civilians.
• 73.9% of them have prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups.
• 60.8% of them are not self-radicalized.
We have found seven strong two-way associations:
• Civilian targets imply having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• The usage of other weapons than firearms implies having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, and vice versa.
• The usage of other weapons than firearms implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
• The usage of weapons other than firearms implies being arrested at the incident scene, and vice versa.
• Being arrested at the incident scene implies civilian targets, and vice versa.
We also found the following strong one-way associations:
• Having no prior criminal history implies having prior contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, civilian targets, and the usage of weapons other than firearms.
• Having no trigger event implies contacts to extremist/terrorist groups, the usage of weapons other than firearms, and being arrested at the incident scene.
• Not being self-radicalized implies the usage of weapons other than firearms. 
Association Chains
In this section, we extract chain rules. A chain rule is a chain of associations that satisfy a cohesion threshold level of 70% and an overall minimum confidence threshold level of 70% given an initial node.
Each node represents a behavior or an attack characteristic and is filled with a color code indicating chronological occurrence. The color codes for the timeline is presented in Figure 7 . Finally, two-way arrows indicate that if the nodes on each edge of a two-way arrow are interchanged, the chain still satisfy the minimum confidence level for that rule. Overall evaluation of LAs and post-9/11 LAs do not produce any implication chains. However, Figure   8 presents the chains for pre-9/11 LAs. The central theme for pre-9/11 LAs is not being self-radicalized, fatalities, and the usage of firearms. As aforementioned, while pre-9/11 LAs are relatively homogeneous, post-9/11 LAs are very heterogeneous and do not produce any association chains. Similarly, ideological classification has not produced any association chains, as well. Among the incident-scene behavior-based classification, maximum damagers and attention seekers do not yield any chains. However, the chains for symbolic attackers and daredevils are given in Figure 9 and Figure 10 . Behavior-based classification has yielded longer and statistically more robust chains compared to other classification schemes. The association chain for Cluster 1 is presented in Figure 11 . This group involves more ordinary people who may not be considered threatening. They have no prior criminal history or contacts to other extremist, radical, or terrorist groups. However, after a trigger, their grievance channels to an attack intent with the use of firearms. Consequently, fatality rate of their attacks is high. Cluster
1 is the only group that leaks intent and their leakage pattern is mostly online. Hence, they leave their "writeprints" on the internet. 
Temporal Associations
Among behavioral characteristics, online leakage and trigger events are important and traceable milestones on the pathway to an attack. In this section, we will provide statistical properties of each LA type.
The most prominent landmark is the trigger event and its timing. Some of the timings are available on the databases. However, for most of these timings, we were able to gather information through local and national newspaper archives. Pre-9/11 LAs are excluded in the analyses because their trigger times are seldom readily available online.
72 of the 99 triggering events have the exact dates. 24 attacks have the exact week, two of them have the exact month and four of them have the exact year. In the statistical analyses, we have used the day and the week data because month and year information assumptions largely affect the results.
The statistical properties of the duration between trigger event and the attack are given in Table 7 . The temporal deviations between triggers for each group are very high and even though the association rules and chains hold, the temporal deviations between trigger event and attack are very large. Despite the large standard deviations of temporal difference between mileposts, medians provide valuable insights. Almost 50% of the LAs attack in a month after the trigger. Even though daredevils are more impulsive than other types, attention seekers have a much smaller median, that is, 50% of attention seekers attack in less than 5 days after the trigger. Likely, 50% of Group 2 (mostly consists of symbolic attackers and attention seekers) attacks in less than a week after the trigger. One important remark is maximum damagers have longer duration than any other group; hence, it can be argued that high fatality rate requires high attack preparation time.
Conclusions and Future Work
The face of terrorism has dramatically changed, especially over the last two decades. The number of attacks by individuals have been more frequent than ever, making LA terrorism one of the most accelerating man-made threats, especially in the US. As a result, there is a need for academic work to understand LA behavior and characteristics. While understanding LA behavior have been studied qualitatively and quantitatively, the associations and connections between those behavioral characteristics have not been analyzed in a temporal manner for an attempt to intervene at the right time.
In this study, distal and proximal characteristics of LAs are analyzed together with attack characteristics and after-attack behaviors. However, the term "behavior" indicates different concepts in literature.
To provide clarity on this term, we have defined four temporal behavior phases: early behavior, preparatory behavior, incident-scene behavior, and after attack behavior. Using 25 binary characteristics, we first compare pre-and post-9/11 LAs. The results indicate that while pre-9/11 LAs had prior contacts to extremist/radical groups and mostly radicalized by the people in their environment, post-9/11 LAs are more diverse. The most noticeable change we have found is that LA terrorism has trickled down to people that do not have prior connections, and the weapon of choice has diverged greatly.
Additionally, besides ideological classification, we introduce two new classifications of LAs: incidentscene-based and behavior-based classification. Incident-scene-based classification is achieved through the data obtained with the game developed in the GRIST Lab and behavior-based classification is obtained through the clustering of 25 binary characteristics. The incident-scene-based data provides five types of attackers: maximum damagers, symbolic attackers, daredevils, attention seekers, and stallers. Behaviorbased classification further divides maximum damagers to "me vs. them" and "us vs. them" types.
Through behavior-based classification, we are able understand the evolution process of an LA attacker by producing association chains.
Triggering event and leakage are traceable characteristics if they have online "writeprints". Hence, our further analysis evaluates if these landmarks differ according to the LA type. However, the durations between triggering event and attack, or the durations between leakage and attack have high standard deviations for each LA type. Moreover, these durations do not have a statistically significant effect on the fatal attack rates. Hence, further analysis is required for connecting behavior to attack timeline.
Appendices A Mathematical Interpretation of the A-priori Algorithm
Let S be a set of d items, i.e. S = si : i = 1, 2, . . . , d, and T be a set of n transactions in a database, i.e. T = ti : i = 1, 2, . . . , n. An association rule is of the form A → B where A and B are mutually exclusive subsets of S. The width (w) of j th transaction is defined as the number of items in the related transaction, that is,
with 1{·} denoting the indicator function of the event defined in the parentheses, i.e.
The calculation of support for an itemset A is defined as σA = n j=1 s i ∈A 1{si ∈ Tj} n .
(
Note that this is the fraction of transactions that demonstrate all the characteristics of itemset A. If the frequency ratio of itemset A surpasses a given threshold, the itemset is considered to be frequent enough to be a candidate for an association generalization.
Association rules are constructed through mutually exclusive subsets of frequent itemsets. For a frequent itemset A, an association rule is of the form X → Y where X ∪ Y = A and X ∩ Y = ∅, that is, the rules are constructed among all nonempty mutually exclusive subsets of A. For the association rule of the form X → Y, the confidence (γXY ) of a rule defines the frequency that, given a transaction contains the items in Y, the transaction also contains the items in X , and it is given as in Eq. 3. A rule should hold at a certain confidence threshold.
The lift (λXY ), also called interestingness factor, is defined as a test measure that the posterior probability of the associations is higher than the prior probability (Eq. 4). A lift value higher than 1 indicates a strong dependence. λXY = σXY σX · σY = n j=1 1{X ∈ Tj} · 1{Y ∈ Tj} n j=1 1{X ∈ Tj} · n j=1 1{Y ∈ Tj} .
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A.1 Statistical Significance of Association Rules
For a rule X → Y, this test uses normal approximation of binomial distribution. The support of X (σX ) and the support of Y (σY ) signify the probability of X and Y appearing in a random transaction, respectively. If X and Y are independent, X ∪ Y occurs in a transaction with probability σX σY . The number of rows that contain X or Y is a binomial random variable. Then, given the transaction size of n, the number of transactions that contain X ∪ Y is nσX σY where the variance is nσX σY (1 − σX σY ).
With Chebyshev's inequality and the normal approximation to the binomial distribution, we test the hypothesis that X and Y are independent using the following formula:
In this formula, K ≤ 2, refers to the significance level of p = 0.05. For testing multiple rules, we apply the Bonferroni adjustment. If m rules are tested, then (m)K must be used instead of K for the same significance level. 
A.2 Association Rule Chains and R-Rules
with c(R ) = i=1,...,r−1;j=i+1,...,r c(ai, aj), ai, aj ∈ R ,
and c(R ) = i=1,...,r−1;j=i+1,...,r c(ai, aj), ai, aj ∈ R .
Here, r is the number of rules in the association, ai and aj are elements of sets R, R and R , c(R ) and c(R ) are the cohesion value of the rules in sets R and R . The minimum coherence threshold is predetermined as 0.7, similar to the confidence value. As an additional robustness criterion for an association chain of the form X → Y → Z, a minimum confidence threshold of 0.7 for P (Y Z|X) is also employed.
